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NOTES
ADVERTISING AND THE BUYER'S REMEDIES
The institution of advertising is of comparatively ancient origin.'
Indeed, many of the features of modern advertising and many of its
abuses were present in the formative period of the common law of
sales.2 However, when the total national expenditure for advertising
exceeds five and a half billion dollars, as it did in 1950,3 there is evidence that this institution has grown beyond the imaginations of the
17th and 18th century jurists. Particularly is this true when we consider the continent-wide scope of present-day advertising. It seems
self-evident that the contact which existed between producers and
consumers in earlier economic systems has, to a large measure, presently disappeared, except insofar as it has been maintained through
advertising.
It has been felt for many years that the abuses of advertising deserve
curative measures, even by the advertising profession itself.4 The
measures that have been adopted, however, as expressed in the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,5 and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 6 are of little help to the individual consumer who seeks
damages or restitution for the injury he has suffered through misleading advertising. These statutory remedies are social remedies - criminal and injunctive7 - and of mere tactical value to the buyer-plaintiff.
Thus the injured consumer has been left with the often archaic remedies of the common law as they have been codified in the Uniform
Sales Act. Therefore, it seems appropriate to examine the relationship
between advertising and a buyer's civil remedies.
1. Lyon, Advertising, 1 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 469
2. Id. at 470.

(1930).

3. Advertising, 1951 BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR 20.
4. Note, 36 YALE, L.J. 1155 (1927), describes the editorial efforts of PRINTERS
INK, an advertising trade journal, to promote a statute making fraudulent advertising a misdemeanor. This Note also relates the close cooperation of the
advertisers' associations in this endeavor.
5. 52 STAT. 1041 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301 et seq. (1952).
6. 38 STAT. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41 et seq. (1952).
7. Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 49 STAT. 981 (1935), as amended,
27 U.S.C.A. §§ 205(f), 207 (1952); Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, 52
STAT. 1041 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 321, 332, 333. 334 (1952); Federal
Trade Commission Act, 38 STAT. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 41
et seq. (1952). The laws relating to the United States Post Office provide similar remedies, REV. STAT. § 3929, as amended, 39 U.S.C.A. § 259 (1928); and
63 STAT. 94 (1949), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (1950). With regard to federal regulation of advertising, see Note, 53 HARV. L. REV. 828 (1940). On state statutes
regulating advertising, see collection of statutes in Note, 36 YALE L.J. 1155
(1927), and collection of cases in 89 A.L.R. 1004 (1934). Generally, see FINR:ELHOR, LEGAL PHASES OF ADVERTISING c. 21 (1938); BORDEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF ADVERTISING 801 et seq. (1942) (considerable discussion of the "ethical"
problem, but admittedly concerned only with the abstract problem of the
seller's honesty); Isaacs, The Consumer At Law, 173 ANNALS 177, 180 (1934)
("In any event, a legal remedy is a poor substitute for not having been hurt
in the first place." Small consolation for the injured buyer.)
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It is the purpose of this Note to show how injured buyers have obtained relief where the sales to them were induced by misleading
advertising, in spite of many legal doctrines which fail to take into
account the widespread development of the institution of advertising. 8
Since most advertising directed to the general public concerns sales
of chattels, no attempt is made herein to discuss sales of realty or intangibles. The Uniform Sales Act is so limited,9 and the many special
concepts surrounding sales of realty and corporate securities 10 necessitate a delimitation in this respect.
I.

PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATION

One of the first problems facing the buyer-plaintiff is that of integrating the advertisement that induced the sale into the sale itself
upon which his action is based. The manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer
and consumer have tended to think of the two as parts of a whole, or
as steps in a process." Thus the advertisers' theory is that the advertisement creates a desire in the buyer, and that the purchase is a
fulfillment of that desire. Nevertheless, the law has traditionally
viewed sales as completely apart from the advertising which induced
them and has demanded a showing of a link between the two in order
to consider the advertising at all.
A. Advertisements as Offers
The question of whether there is a contract upon which to sue may
depend upon whether the advertisement constitutes an offer. It is
theoretically possible for an advertisement to be an offer. 12 Nevertheless, courts have generally held that an advertisement constitutes
merely an invitation to the reader to make an offer. 13 This theory as8. Nearly all of the older cases and many modern cases treat representations found in advertising like any other representations by a seller. Contrast
this attitude with the very analytical approach found in such cases as Madouros
v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445 (1936);
Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 SE.2d 813 (1940); Baxter v. Ford
Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, 88 A.L.R. 521, aff'd mem. on rehearing,
15 P.2d 1118 (1932). Even Williston avoids making any analysis of sales induced by advertising separate from the general law of sales. See, however, 1
WILLISTON, SALES § 202 (Rev. ed. 1948). For the most part cases cited herein
are cases involving advertising. However a number of rules of law apply to
all forms of representations and not merely to advertisements. Thus frequent
citation is made to general authorities on sales where a legal proposition is
supported by nonadvertising cases. For an almost complete collection of cases
on advertising, see Notes, 28 A.L.R. 991 (1924) and 158 A.L.R. 1413 (1945).
See generally, FINKELHOR, LEGAL PHASES OF ADVERTISING (1938).
9. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 76. 3 WILLISTON, SALES § 619 (a) (Rev. ed. 1948).

10. See, e.g., the Securities Act of 1933, 48

STAT.

74 (1933), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a

et seq. (1951); and the various state "blue sky laws."
11. VOLD, SALES 444 (1931); Bogert and Fink, Business Practice Regarding
Warrantiesin the Sale of Goods, 25 ILL. L. REv. 400, 409, 416 (1930).
12. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 27 (Rev. ed. 1936).

13. Georgian Co. v. Bloom, 27 Ga. App. 468, 108 S.E. 813 (1921) (seller as-

sumed advertisement binding and sought unsuccessfully to charge publisher for
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sumes that "haggling over prices" is still the dominant feature of sales
transactions,14 and that an advertised price is only an argumentative
starting point. The assumption is no longer true in fact, and the too
frequent application of the rule has been criticized. 15 Certainly the
question depends for its answer upon the manifest intention of thel
parties, 16 and some types of advertisements have been construed as so
intended 7 - notably advertisements offering rewards.' 8 In the leading
English case of Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.,19 the advertiser
announced that it would pay a reward to anyone contacting influenza
after using its patent medicine. The advertisement was held to constitute an offer on the authority of the "reward cases." It is significant,
however, that the advertisement was actually intended to induce
sales, 20 even though it was in the form of an offer of reward.

B. Parol Evidence Rule
When, in a suit by a buyer-plaintiff, the existence of a contract is
not at issue, his problem is to show that the promises or representations
in the advertisement are a part of the existing contract. The chief
obstacle to this showing arises when the defendant invokes the parol
evidence rule -that an unambiguous written contract cannot be varied by extrinsic evidence. 21 There are two principal methods by
which this rule may be made inapplicable.
Obviously where the contract refers the buyer to a catalogue or
circular for his warranties, those warranties are a part of the contract
misprinting advertisement); Lovett v. Frederick Loeser & Co., 124 Misc. 81,
207 N.Y. Supp. 753 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1924); cf. Craft v. Elder & Johnston Co., 38
N.E.2d 416 (Ohio App. 1941); see Salisbury v. Credit Service, Inc., 9 Harr. 377,
199 Ati. 674, 682 (Del. Super. Ct. 1937). But cf. R. E. Crummer & Co. v. Nuveen, 147 F.2d 3, 157 A.L.R. 739 (7th Cir. 1945); Vigo Agricultural Society v.
Brumfield, 102 Ind. 146, 1 N.E. 382 (1885); Tarbell v. A. J. Stevens & Co., 7
Iowa 163 (1858); Reynolds & M'Farlane v. M'Farlane, 1 Over. *487 (Tenn.
1809). For collection of cases, see Note, 157 A.L.R. 744 (1945).
14. See infra Part I, § D, on auctions, where "disciplined haggling" is still
the dominant feature.
15. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 27 (Rev. ed. 1936).
16. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 25 (1932). Compare the "test" in 1 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS 58 (Rev. ed. 1936), with "test" in 1 WILLISTON, SALES 6 (Rev. ed.
1948).
17. See, e.g., R. E. Crummer & Co. v. Nuveen, 147 F.2d 3, 157 A.L.R. 739 (7th

Cir. 1945); Vigo Agricultural Society v. Brumfield, 102 Ind. 146, 1 N.E. 382
(1885); Tarbell v. A. J. Stevens &Co., 7 Iowa 163 (1858); Reynolds & M'Farlane
v. M'Farlane, 1 Tenn. 487 (1809).
18. Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., L.R. [1893] 1 Q.B. 256 (C.A. 1892);
1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 58 (Rev. ed. 1936).
19. L.R. [1893] 1 Q.B. 256 (C.A. 1892).
20. The judges in the case were aware of this distinguishing feature. Note
their concern with the question of the consideration for the advertiser's promise,
L.R. [1893] 1 Q.B. at 264, 271.
21. Refinery Equipment, Inc. v. Wickett Refining Co., 158 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.
1947); A. C. McClurg & Co. v. Herbert 0. Tomlinson, 186 Ill. App. 55 (1914);
Rock Island Implement Co. v. Wally, 268 S.W. 904 (Mo. App. 1925); MadisonKipp Corp. v. Price Battery Corp., 311 Pa. 22, 166 Ati. 377 (1933); Somerville

v. Gullett Gin Co., 137 Tenn. 509, 194 S.W. 576 (1917); Buchanan v. Laber, 39
Wash. 410, 81 Pac. 911 (1905).
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by the doctrine of incorporation by reference. 22 One case2 3 has indicated that a circular attached in some manner to the written contract
forms a part of that contract. It might be argued then, that an order
blank forming one of the pages of a mail order catalogue incorporates
that catalogue, even without express reference thereto.
Another manner in which the parol evidence rule may be avoided
is by construing the contract as an informal one comprising all the
negotiations leading to the sale.24 Any single written document therefore would not embody the entire contract, and any disclaimer of warranty contained therein would not eliminate prior representations by
the seller. Realistically the seller usually has control of the negotiations. The mere fact that he maneuvers the buyer into signing a written document as the last step in these negotiations should not be said
to exclude them from the contract unless the document actually purports to be the entire written contract. 25 Whether a formal written
contract exists is a question of law.26 Of course, the parol evidence
rule is not a defense when the prior, unintegrated representation of
27
the seller was fraudulent.
C. Lapse of Time
The courts have given relatively little attention to the problem of
when a representation by the seller should be said to have lapsed.
Assume that a dealer has advertised in his catalogue that his mill "will
grind equally well substances as hard as flint and as soft as lime."
22. Refinery Equipment, Inc. v. Wickett Refining Co., 158 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.
1947) ; Hemwall Auto Co. v. Michigan Avenue Trust Co., 195 Ill. App. 407
(19155; Rock Island Implement Co. v. Wally, 268 S.W. 904 (Mo. App. 1925);
see Somerville v. Gullett Gin Co., 137 Tenn. 509, 519, 194 S.W. 576, 579 (1917);
Milburn Wagon Co. v. Nisewarner, 90 Va. 714, 19 S.E. 846 (1894); Buchanan
v. Laber, 39 Wash. 410, 81 Pac. 911 (1905).
23. Johnston Bros., Inc. v. Village of Coopersville, 261 Mich. 26, 246 N.W. 551
(1932).
24. See, e.g., Luitweiler Pumping Engine Co. v. Ukiah Water & Improvement
Co., 16 Cal. App. 198, 116 Pac. 707 (1911); Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor
Co., 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118, 28 A.L.R. 986 (1922). For an extreme case
holding the other way, see A. C. McClurg & Co. v. Herbert 0. Tomlinson, 186
Ill. App. 55 (1914). Williston discusses this technique at length: WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 643 (Rev. ed. 1936); 1 WILUSTON, SALES § 215 (Rev. ed. 1948).

25. See cases cited note 23 supra. Cf. Claghorn v. Lingo, 62 Ala. 230 (1878);

Anderson v. Tyler, 223 Iowa 1033, 274 N.W. 48 (1937); Robben v. Farmers'
Co-operative Co., 120 Kan. 310, 278 Pac. 10 (1929); A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co.
v. Case Shingle & Lumber Co., 152 Wash. 37, 276 Pac. 892 (1929).
26. Claghorn v. Lingo, 62 Ala. 230 (1878); CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 595 (1951)
(except in very close cases). Contra: Luitweiler Pumping Engine Co. v.
Ukiah Water & Improvement Co., 16 Cal. App. 198, 116 Pac. 707 (1911); Cobb
v. Wallace, 45 Tenn. 539 (1868). To allow the jury to determine whether the
writing was intended to embody the whole contract would require that the
prior representations be admitted in evidence conditionally and that the jury
disregard them if it finds the writing so intended -a difficult matter even for
reasonable jurymen. See cases collected in Note, 70 A.L.R. 752 (1931).
27. See, e.g., Williams v. Bullock Tractor Co., 186 Cal. App. 32, 198 Pac. 780
(1921); Ventura Mfg. & Implement Co. v. Warfield, 37 Cal. App. 147, 174 Pac.
382 (1918); 1 WILLISTON, SALES 557-58 (Rev. ed. 1948).
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Two years later a buyer orders such a mill from this seller. Is the
seller still bound by his two-year-old representation? The intention
of the parties is mainly involved here,28 and the reasonable man test
might be invoked. 29 The following factors are offered as possibly affecting the result: the length of time between the representation and
the sale, the type of goods sold, customs of the trade, frequency of new
catalogues, 30 changes in the seller's line which may have occurred in
the interim 3' and intervening factors acting upon the buyer which may
have induced the sale, such as recommendations by other users.
33
Obviously, if the contract sets up a time limitation on the warranties,
such a provision would control.
D. Special Rules Regarding Auctions
The auction sale is one of the oldest methods by which chattels are
sold. Advertisements of these auctions, by poster and handbills, were
one of the first forms of advertising. 34 The common law of sales is
well grounded in the facts here because the auction is one of the few
economic institutions that has not changed materially since the Industrial Revolution. From the buyer's viewpoint, little complaint can be
made of the doctrine that the advertisement of an auction is an invitation to make an offer 35 or the general rule that the oral terms of sale
announced immediately prior to the auction prevail over the terms
stated in the advertisement. 36 In auction sales, the buyer and seller,
or his agent, confront each other; there is usually opportunity for
buyers to inspect the goods to be sold; and the competition is between
relatively skilled buyers rather than sellers - a situation atypical to
modern commercial life.
28. Cf. Asbestolith VIfg. Co. v. Howland, 120 N.Y. Supp. 93 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
29. R. E. Crummer & Co. v. Nuveen, 147 F.2d 3, 157 A.L.R. 739 (7th Cir. 1945);
see Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., L.R. [1893] 1 Q.B. 256 (C.A. 1892) (an
offer, but note facts as discussed in § A, supra).
30. Cf. Wilcox, Gibbs & Co. v. Henderson, 64 Ala. 535 (1879).
31. Ibid.
32. Cf. Morris v. Bradley Fertilizer Co., 64 Fed. 55 (3d Cir. 1894).
33. Cf. Snow v. The Schomacker Manufacturing Co., 69 Ala. 111, 44 Am.
Rep. 509 (1881).
34. Cherington, Auctions, 2 ENcyc. Soc. ScI. 309 (1930); see also, Korber v.
City of Portland, 135 Ore. 233, 295 Pac. 203 (1931), for historical discussion.
35. Ransberger v. Ing, 55 Mo. App. 621 (1894); Ashcom v. Smith, 2 Penr. &
W. 211, 21 Am. Dec. 437 (Pa. 1830); cf. Eisenhauer v. Brosnan, 44 La. Ann. 742,
11 So. 43 (1892). See also cases cited note 12 supra.
36. Kendall v. Boyer, 144 Iowa 303, 122 N.W. 941, 24 L.R.A. (Ns) 488, Ann.
Cas. 1912A 1127 (1909); accord, Lipsett Wrecking & Salvage Corp. v. Joseph
Reid Gas Engine Corp., 137 F.2d 847, (3d Cir. 1943); Satterfield v. Smith, 33
N.C. 60 (1850); cf. Eisenhauer v. Brosnan, 44 La. Ann. 742, 11 So. 43 (1892);
Nott & Co. v. Bank of Orleans, 19 La. 22 (1841); Burling v. Brinn, 116 Misc.
130, 189 N.Y. Supp. 707 (Sup. Ct. 1921); Steen v. Neva, 37 N.D. 40, 163 N.W.
272 (1917). But cf. United States v. Atlanta Wrecking Co.. 8 F.2d 542 (N.D. Ga.
1925); Palmer v. Mt. Sterling Nat. Bank, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 790. 18 S.W. 234 (1892);
Navarette v. Travis-Ziegler Co. 194 N.Y. Supp. 832 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1922);
Flight v. Booth, 1 Bing. N.C. 370, 131 Eng. Rep. 1160 (C.P. 1834) (last four
cases indicate fact situations where either buyer or seller may be able to urge
binding force of advertisement).
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H. REm D s
Beginning in the Nineteenth Century, the courts tended to forget the
earlier history of the common law, when actions on warranties were in
trespass on the case, 37 and regarded the warranty obligation as promissory in nature. 38 Thus the requirements of privity of contract 39 and
intent to warrant 4° were often grafted onto what should have been
actions sounding in tort for misrepresentation. This has been criticized
as unduly limiting the buyer's chances for recovery, on the theory that
warranties can arise either from promises or from representations
alone.41 However, many of these strict requirements have now been
eliminated. 42 Furthermore, liberal rules of pleading allowing joinder of
causes of action now give the buyer opportunity to fire a broadside
complaint containing counts in implied or express warranty, deceit
43
and negligence.
The common basis for all the buyer's remedies is illustrated by the
case of Marsh v. Usk Hardware Co.,144 where a buyer of explosives was
injured by following directions for use contained in the seller's advertising brochure and sued for negligence. The court stated that technically the action was one for deceit, but pointed out the element of
negligence involved in an action for deceit and concluded, "Even in
an action resting upon a wrong growing out of a breach of warranty
contained in a contract of sale of an article inherently dangerous, the
37. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 195 (Rev. ed. 1948).
38. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 197 (Rev. ed. 1948). Many cases still commit this
error. See, e.g., Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F.2d 889, 111 A.L.R. 1235
(7th Cir. 1937); Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269, 128 Atl. 186 (1925); Degouveia v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 100 S.W.2d 336 (1936);
Jordon v. Brouwer, 86 Ohio App. 505, 93 N.E.2d 49 (1949). That this conclusion is not required under the Uniform Sales Act, see WILLISTON, SALES 499500 (Rev. ed. 1948).
39. See infra, § A, subsec. 5.
40. See infra, § A, subsec. 1.
41. VOLD, SALES §§ 140, 142 (1931); 1 WILLISTON, SALES §§ 194, 197 (Rev. ed.
1948). This distinction and the fact that a third type of warranties are not
affected by the seller's representations but imposed by law, i.e., implied warranties, is carefully discussed in Ferson, Agency to Make Warranties, 5 VAND.
L. REV.1 (1951).
42. See infra, § A subsec. 1, 5.
43. See, e.g., Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946) (warranty
and negligence); Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F.2d 597 (2d
Cir. 1938) (deceit and warranty); Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F.2d 889,
111 A.L.R. 1235 (7th Cir. 1937) (deceit and warranty); Laclede Steel Co. v.
Silas Mason Co., 57 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. La. 1946) (warranty and negligence);
Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382, 17 A.L.R. 649
(1920) (warranties, express and implied, and negligence); Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940) (warranty and negligence). For
problems involved where the contract suggests an exclusive remedy to the
buyer, see 3 WILLISTON, SALES § 611a (Rev. ed. 1948). As to whether the buyer
must elect as between an action for damages and for rescission, see 3 WILLISTON,
SALES §§ 612, 612a (Rev. ed. 1948).
44. 73 Wash. 543, 132 Pac. 241 (1913).
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right of recovery may in a sense45 be regarded as resting upon the negligence on the part of the seller."
The seller's advertising involves mainly three remedies available to
the buyer: breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty
and negligence. The buyer's action in tort for deceit differs from the
above-mentioned remedies only in the requirement of scienter46 and
in the amount of damages allowable. 47 Neither of these items is peculiarly affected by the seller's advertising, and though an action for
deceit may be predicated on deceitful expressions in advertising, these
are no different in function than any misrepresentations by a seller
of goods.
A. Breach of Express Warranty and Nonfraudulent Misrepresentation
1. Intent to Warrant and Reliance
The older cases required a showing by the plaintiff that the war48
ranty upon which the suit was based was so intended by the seller.
Though this requirement has been eliminated in many cases, 49 the

authorities do require reliance by the buyer as an element of his cause
of action. 50 If the seller's liability is regarded as contractual, it would
seem more realistic to say that what is contemplated by the courts
in using the words "intention to warrant" and "reliance by the buyer"
is no more than the mutual assent necessary for any contractual obligation. This, in turn, should be governed by the objective theory of
contracts, rather than an attempted dissection of the parties' motives.
If, as is urged by Williston and Vold, 51 the liability is ex delicti, the
seller's intention is an intention to warrant; but reliance is essential
to proof of causation.
Under either theory, there does not seem to be any justification for
denying the buyer his remedy in sales resulting from advertising,
merely because of a failure to prove technical "intention to warrant"
or "reliance." It is indisputable that the advertiser intends to communicate the facts represented to the potential buyer. And it should
be assumed that the buyer relied on the advertisement which induced
his purchase. The buyer-plaintiff should only be required to show that
(1) the advertisement was published correctly as ordered by the ad45. 132 Pac. at 245.
46. 3 WILLISTON, SALES 406 (Rev. ed. 1948).
47. 3 WILLISTON, SALES § 613a (Rev. ed. 1948).
48. Burns v. Limerick, 178 Mo. ApD. 145, 165 S.W. 1166 (1914); League Cycle
Co. v. Abrahams, 27 Misc. 548, 58 N.Y. Supp. 306 (Sup. Ct. 1899); Enger v.
Dawley, 62 Vt. 164, 19 Atl. 478 (1890); 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 211 (Rev. ed.
1948).
49. See cases cited in 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 201 (Rev. ed. 1948).
50. See, e.g.. Landman v. Bloomer, 117 Ala. 312, 23 So. 75 (1898); Harrington
v. Smith. 138 Mass. 92 (1884); Ralston Purina Co. v. Cox, 141 Neb. 432, 3 N.W.2d
748 (1942); VOLD,SALES 446-7 (1931).
51. See note 40 supra.
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vertising seller; and (2) the buyer was induced by the advertisement
to make his purchase.
The new Uniform Commercial Code apparently recognizes the
realities of modern sales induced by advertising, for it defines an express warranty in the following terms: "Any affirmation of fact or
promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and
becomes a basis of the bargain creates an express warranty ... It is
not necessary that [the seller] have a specific intention to make a
52
warranty ....
2. Fact Patterns
Whether the parties contemplated an express warranty in the advertising depends upon the facts of the particular case and is ordinarily
a question for the jury.53 Certain tentative generalizations, however,
can be made as to particular fact patterns. In the sale of agricultural
seeds and fertilizers, sellers have been held to a rather high standard
on their representations in advertising, 54 but it should be noted that
many seed catalogues contain disclaimers of any general warranty of
crop success. 55 It was held in Baumgartner v. Glesener56 that an advertisement of a 95 per cent germinating test of seed does not guarantee
95 per cent germinating power. This distinction seems artificial and
the particular case held there was an implied warranty of germinating
power.5 7 It is self-evident that seeds advertised as oats are warranted
to raise oats and not wheat.58
Sales of animal feeds and animal medicines present a similar fact
pattern, since factors beyond the control of the seller, such as proper
administration, sanitary conditions, and so forth, would militate against
52, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313 (Official Draft, 1952).

53. See, e.g., Wilcox, Gibbs & Co. v. Henderson, 64 Ala. 535 (1879); Kuhn v.
Campbell, 118 Ohio St. 392, 161 N.E. 25 (1928) semble: Davis v. Ferguson
Seed Farms, 255 S.W. 655 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); accord, Roberts v. AnheuserBusch Brewing Ass'n, 211 Mass. 449, 98 N.E. 95 (1912).
54. See, e.g., Wilcox, Gibbs & Co. v. Henderson, 64 Ala. 535 (1879); Claghorn
v. Lingo, 62 Ala. 230 (1878); Baumgartner v. Glesener, 171 Minn. 289, 214 N.W.
27 (1927); White v. Miller, 71 N.Y. 118, 27 Am. Rep. 13 (1877); Bell v. Mills,
68 App. Div. 531, 74 N.Y. Supp. 224, 78 App. Div. 42, 80 N.Y. Supp. 34 (4th
Dep't 1902); Reiger v. Worth Co., 130 N.C. 268, 41 S.E. 377, 89 Am. St. Rep.
865 (1902); Robson v. Miller, 12 S.C. 586 (1879); Gray v. Gurney Seed &
Nursery Co., 57 S.D. 280, 231 N.W. 940 (1930), 62 S.D. 97, 252 N.W. 3 (1933);
Davis v. Ferguson Seed Farms, 255 S.W. 655 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Hoover v.
Utah Nursery Co., 79 Utah 12, 7 P.2d 270 (1932).
55.

Bell

v. Mills, 68 App. Div. 531, 74 N.Y. Supp. 224, 78 App. Div. 42, 80 N.Y.

Supp. 34 (4th Dep't 1902); Gray v. Gurney Seed & Nursery Co., 57 S.D. 280, 231
N.W. 940 (1930), 62 S.D. 97, 252 N.W. 3 (1933); Davis v. Ferguson Seed Farms,
255 S.W. 655 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Hoover v. Utah Nursery Co., 79 Utah 12,
7P.2d 270 (1932).
56. 171 Minn.289, 214 N.W. 27 (1927).
57. Id. at 28.
58. Compare White v. Miller, 71 N.Y. 118, 27 Am. Rep. 13 (1877), with
Hoover v. Utah Nursery Co., 79 Utah 12, 7 P.2d 270 (1932).
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any general warranty of good results. 59 Similar questions of fact arise

in advertisements of sales of animals. Here, however, buyers and
sellers are more often on an equal footing, and sales are frequently
made by auction. Representations of presently existing facts, such as
soundness and pregnancy, 60 are more often held to be intended by the
parties as warranties than representations of less determinable facts,
such as breeding capacity. 61 In Kuhn v. Campbell,62 a representation
in the advertisement that a horse could "trot a 2:15 gait and do it
right" was held by the Supreme Court of Ohio to be a warranty which
was breached when the animal's best time was 2:24, notwithstanding
the fact that the test was run on an eighth of a mile stretch and the
difference in times was thus only slightly over a second. This result
seems extremely favorable to the buyer.
In sales of machinery and allied goods, representations in advertising are held with greater frequency to be express warranties, since
performance is more capable of scientific measurement.6 3 Along this
same line a declaration of chemical constituents, tensile strength, and
64
so forth, is usually held to be an express warranty.
In the sale of canned foods, dairy and bakery products, such words
as "wholesome," "pure" and "healthful" in the advertising are not
generally held to be express warranties, 65 but buyers might successfully rely on the remedies for implied warranties of merchantability
and fitness.

66

59. Charles Lomori & Son v. Globe Laboratories, 35 Cal. App.2d 248, 95 P.2d
173 (1939); Ralston Purina Co. v. Cox, 141 Neb. 432, 3 N.W.2d 748 (1942);
Ralston Purina Co. v. Iiams, 143 Neb. 588, 10 N.W.2d 452 (1943).
60. Ryan v. Brown, 206 Ill. App. 534 (1917) (horse is sound); Wallace v.
Shoemaker, 194 Ind. 419, 143 N.E. 285 (1924) (sow is with litter); Hadley v.
The Clinton County Importing Co., 13 Ohio St. 502, 82 Am. Dec. 454 (1862) (cow

is sound); Kuhn v. Campbell, 118 Ohio St. 392, 161 N.E. 25 (1928) (horse's
ability to trot a 2:15 gait).
61. Roberts v. Applegate, 153 Ill. 210, 38 N.E. 676 (1894) (horse would "make
his mark as a foal getter"). But cf. Blair v. Hall, 201 S.W. 945 (Mo. App. 1918)
(cow was regular breeder).
62. 118 Ohio St. 392, 161 N.E. 25 (1928).
63. Sharples Separator Co. v. Skinner, 251 Fed. 25 (9th Cir. 1918); Lathom
v. Shipley, 86 Iowa 543, 53 N.W. 342 (1892); Turner v. Central Hardware Co.,
353 Mo. 1182, 186 S.W.2d 603, 158 A.L.R. 1402 (1945); Charter Gas-Engine Co.
v. Kellom, 79 App. Div. 231, 79 N.Y. Supp. 1019 (1st Dep't 1903); Buchanan
v. Laber, 39 Wash. 410, 81 Pac. 911 (1905).
64. Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946) (wire rope); Monumental Bronze Co. v. Doty, 92 Mo. App. 5 (1902) (whitebronze monument);
A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Case Shingle & Lumber Co., 152 Wash. 37, 276
Pac. 892 (1929) (wire rope).
65. Newhall v. Ward Baking Co., 240 Mass. 434, 134 N. E. 625 (1922); Lewitus
v. Brown & Secomb, 228 App. Div. 146, 239 N.Y. Supp. 261 (1st Dep't 1930);
accord, Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382, 17 A.L.R.
649 (1920); Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269, 128 Atl. 186 (1925). VoLD, SALES
447 (1931). But cf. Roberts v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n, 211 Mass. 449,
98 N.E. 95 (1912).
66. See, e.g., Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382, 17
A.L.R. 649 (1920). Implied warranty provisions of the Uniform Sales Act are
in §§ 14-16.

1953]

NOTES

3. Testimonials
One form of advertising in general use is that which utilizes the
testimonials of satisfied users, actual or fictitious. Two older cases
have indicated that expressions in testimonials are not the warranties
of the advertiser unless he expressly adopts them. 67 No recent cases
have passed on this question, but it seems likely that the advertiser
could be held on an express warranty, whether or not he expressly
affirms the statement of the indorser. One recent writer has even argued that the indorser himself should be liable. 68 Such a doctrine
would open wide the field of buyers' remedies since modem day indorsers are usually noted for their prominence and solvency.
4. Dealer's Talk
One of the greatest obstacles to a buyer's recovery is the doctrine
that only positive representations of fact are express warranties, and
that statements on the seller's opinion, "dealer's talk," or "puffing," do
69
not fall within this category.
Economists usually distinguish between informative and persuasive
advertising. 70 Informative advertising is of considerable economic
importance. In fact, it has been asserted that mass production and
mass marketing are completely dependent upon informative advertising.71 Persuasive advertising, on the other hand, is not so defensible from
the economist's viewpoint. 2 The argument that persuasive advertising
67. Richey v. Daemicke, 86 Mich. 647, 49 N.W. 516 (1891); Mason v. Chappell,
15 Gratt. 572 (Va. 1860).
68. Note, Liability of Advertising Endorsers, 2 STAx. L. REV. 496 (1950).
69. Refining Equipment, Inc. v. Wickett Refining Co., 158 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.
1947); James Spear Stove & Heating Co. v. General Electric Co., 12 F. Supp.
977 (E.D. Pa. 1934), affd mem., 80 F.2d 1012 (3rd Cir. 1935); Berman v. Woods,
38 Ark. 351 (1881); Roberts v. Applegate, 153 Ill. 210, 38 N.E. 676 (1894);
Ralston Purina Co. v. Rams, 143 Neb. 588, 10 N.W.2d 452 (1943); Ralston
Purina Co. v. Cox, 141 Neb. 432, 3 N.W.2d 748 (1942); Madison-Kipp Corp. v.
Price Battery Corp., 311 Pa. 22, 166 Atl. 377 (1933); Gray v. Burney Seed &
Nursery Co., 57 S.D. 280, 231 N.W. 940 (1930); Mason v. Chappell, 15 Gratt.
572 (Va. 1860); Jendwine v. Slade, 2 Esp. 572, 170 Eng. Rep. 459 (K.B. 1797);
Wilson v. Shaver, 27 Ont. L.R. 218, 8 D.L.R. 627 (1912); see Calhoun v. Vechio,
4 Fed. Cas. No. 2310 at 1049, 1050 (C.C.D. Pa. 1812). But cf. Luitweiler Pumping
Engine Co. v. Ukiah Water & Improvement Co., 16 Cal. App. 198, 116 Pac. 707
(1911); Ryan v. Brown, 206 Ill. App. 534 (1917); Hicks v. Stevens, 121 Ill. 186,
11 N.E. 241 (1887); Economy Hog & Cattle Powder Co. v. Compton, 132 N.E].
642 (Ind. App. 1921), rev'd on other grounds, 192 Ind. 222, 135 N.E. 1 (1922)
Keystone Mausoleum Co. v. Salzman, 72 Pa. Super. 437 (1919); Missouri
Drug Co. v. Wyman, 129 Fed. 623 (C.C.E.D.Mo. 1904). See also 1 WILNSTON,
SALES § 202 (Rev. ed. 1948).
70. TAYLOR, THE EcoNo1WIcs OF ADVERTISING 26-32 (1934). LEVER, ADVERTISING

Arm EcoNxo c THEORY 47 et seq. (1947), indicates that nearly every advertisement is composed of both persuasive and informative features. But
even insofar as the distinction is a matter of degree the following discussion
is pertinent.
71, Lyon, Advertising, 1 ENCYC. Soc. ScI. 469, 470 (1930).

72. See, BORDEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING 150-89, 489-524
(1942); LEVER, op. cit. supra note 70, at 57-95, 122; TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note

70 at 69-88.
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creates demand, which increases production, which, in turn lowers
costs, is said to be incapable of statistical proof. 3 Furthermore, even
assuming that such a result were theoretically possible, 4 it would be
probable only under a system of imperfect competition where the
monopolistic producer was able to manipulate supply and demand
to achieve his most profitable level of production. 75 It should be noted
that our national public policy has been dedicated to increasing competition since the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890.76
Thus there seems to be a conflict between economic and legal
theory, since it is the advertising least desirable from the economist's
viewpoint that is most protected by the law. This is not to say that
purely informative advertising, i.e., positive affirmations of fact, should
be any less binding upon the advertiser. But the apparent conflict in
theory does indicate that the "puffing" loophole should be carefully
guarded lest irresponsible advertisers misuse it.
There is no doubt but that the copywriter's problem is a more difficult one than that which confronts the individual salesman.? Yet,
the only restraint upon the advertiser is the documentary evidence
which he prepares against himself when he publishes an advertisement.
Public policy would be well served by preventing this one restraint 8
from being vitiated by a too lenient attitude of the courts in calling
representations "dealer's talk."
Two of the most extreme decisions allowing the seller to escape
liability for his "dealer's talk" were decided by the Supreme Court of
Nebraska, both in favor of the same company. 9 The seller had stated
on the radio and in newspapers that 300 lbs. of its feed would produce
100 lbs. of pork. Through a security device in favor of the seller, the
73. Taylor, op. cit. supranote 70, at 72-74, 89.
74. In an equilibrium economy, every producer would be producing at his
most profitable level. Thus advertising which induced greater demand for the
product would merely attract new producers. Taylor, op. cit. supra note 70,
at 70.
75. "[T]his will happen if the advertising increases the demand proportionately by an amount which is greater than the proportionate increase in overhead costs resulting from the advertising." Lever, op. cit. supra note 70, at 94.
This hypothesis also assumes that the elasticity of demand for the product is
constant, that marginal costs are constant, that the product is manufactured
under conditions of increasing returns and that the monopolistic producer has
a complete knowledge of his cost conditions. It is doubtful whether these assumptions are all true in every case, particularly the last assumption. Id. at
82-95. See also Taylor, op. cit. supra note 70, at 74-76. It must be granted that
a new producer or a producer making a new product would find advertising
essential to reaching optimum production and that advertising, in such a case
would result in lower costs. Taylor, op. cit. supra note 70, at 71. And note, in
this connection, the phenomenon of nonadvertising producers obtaining benefits of demand for new products stimulated by the advertising, such as the
various imitators of Coca-Cola. Borden, op. cit. supra note 72, at 502.
76. 26 STAT. 209 (1890).

77. Taylor, op. cit. supra note 70, at 123-4.
78. See Hicks v. Stevens, 121 Ill. 186, 11 N.E. 241, 245 (1887).
79. Ralston Purina Co. v. Iiams, 143 Neb. 588, 10 N.W.2d 452 (1943); Ralston
Purina Co. v. Cox, 141 Neb. 432, 3 N.W.2d 748 (1942).
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buyers were further lulled into the belief that the amount of feed
bargained for would be sufficient for the winter. The feed sold ran out
and the seller foreclosed on his security. The seller was allowed to
recover a deficiency judgment against the purchasers of the fed, the
court holding that the advertising campaign was "dealer's talk."80
These two cases seem clearly wrong and against the weight of
authority.8 '
5. Privity of Contract
The requirement that the plaintiff and defendant be in a relation of
privity of contract8 2 has received more attention from the courts than
any other element of the buyer's cause of action for misrepresentation
or breach of warranty. As a consequence, considerable liberalization
83
of the privity requirement has been achieved.
One reason for the abolition of the privity requirement is that it has
become extremely unworkable and unjust in the context of modern
business. Today several intermediate persons may stand between the
manufacturer and the ultimate consumer, any one of which may have
agents, and any of which may be wholly or partially responsible for
representations in advertising.
The most significant feature of modern merchandising practice is
the control over distribution that the manufacturer retains although
he has made an outright sale of the product to a middleman. 84 It is
common knowledge that dealerships in automotive and related machinery fields are closely supervised, and that beverage bottling franchises and territorially exclusive contracts for the handling of high
quality and style merchandise are arranged by manufacturers who
then advertise on a national scale, often listing the establishments
where their products can be purchased.
In the old domestic economy, goods were sold directly to the consumer by the maker; thus every sale involved privity of contract with
the producer. In the early stages of the Industrial Revolution, the
manufacturer sold goods outright to local retailers who then carried
out all merchandising functions including advertising. In both stages
80. 143 Neb. 588, 10 N.W.2d at 455; 141 Neb. 432, 3 N.W.2d at 749.
81. See cases cited note 68 supra.
82. See, e.g., Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F.2d 889, 111 A.L.R. 1235 (7th
Cir. 1937); Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269, 128 Atl. 186 (1925); DeGouveia v.
H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 100 S.W.2d 336 (1936); Jordon v.
Brouwer, 86 Ohio App. 505. 93 N.E.2d 4Al (1.AQa'
83. See, e.g., Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946); Laclede
Steel Co. v. Silas Mason Co., 67 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. La. 1946): Davis v. Van
Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382, 17 A.L.R. 649 (1920); Simpson v.
American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,
168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, 88 A.L.R. 521, ajfd mem. on rehearing,15 P.2d 1118
(1932); see Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275,
90 S.W.2d 445, 450 (1936).
84. Taylor, op. cit. supra note 70, c. 1. For further evidence of this practice,
see Robinson-Patman Act, 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C.A. § 13 (1951).
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any representations sued on by a dissatisfied buyer had been made by
a party with whom that buyer was in privity of contract. In our present economy, however, the seller often makes few advertising representations, and the manufacturer who does make them85 is not in a
contractual relationship with the buyer.
The essential injustice of this is apparent, especially in view of the
fact that the manufacturer is highly benefited by the advertising which
stimulates demand and induces future sales, 8 even though he has sold
the goods to the intermediate vendor before he wages his advertising
campaign.
Some courts still consider actions for breach of warranty as being
contractual in nature and distinguish therefrom actions sounding in
tort for deceit or negligence. Thus, these courts require privity in the
first instance and not in the second.8 7 It is to be noted, however, that
a just and well-reasoned opinion in a "tort-sounding" action for misrepresentation will frequently motivate other courts to follow it and
dispense with the privity requirement in ex contractu-type actions for
breach of warranty. 88 This seems to support the contention of modern
authorities 89 that the action for breach of warranty is not necessarily
either purely contractual nor delictial.
Two theories have been advanced to overcome the absence of privity
in the traditional sense. The first is that warranties made by manufacturers run with the chattel to the ultimate consumer.9 0 It can be
argued that this theory embodies a realistic approach, since there is
some evidence that both manufacturers and consumers so regard the
manufacturer's obligation. 9 ' However, it should not be necessary to
take the real property doctrine of covenants running with the land out
of the context that gave rise to it merely to achieve a just result. The
85. Taylor, op. cit. supra note 70, c. 1.
86. "Here we have written assurances that were obviously intended by the

manufacturer and distributor... for the ultimate consumer.... The assurances

[were] an attractive inducement to the purchaser for consumption, and such
purchase in large quantities was advantageous to the manufacturer." Simps6n

v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813, 815 (1940).
87. See, e.g., Chanin v. Chervolet Motor Co., 89 F.2d 889, 111 A.L.R. 1235 (7th
Cir. 1937); Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693, 164 A.L.R. 559
(1946); Newhall v. Ward Baking Co., 240 Mass. 434, 134 N.E. 625 (1922).

88. In the leading case of Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d

409, 88 A.L.R. 521, aff'd mem. on rehearing, 15 P.2d 1118 (1932), the court held
that no privity of contract was required in a tort-sounding action for misrepresentation. The next following decisions citing this case in the Supreme

Court of Washington all dealt with contract-sounding actions for breach of

warranty, but the court did not attempt to draw any distinctions therefrom:
Reusch v. Ford Motor Co., 196 Wash. 213, 82 P.2d 556, 559 (1938); Murphy v.

Plymouth Motor Corp., 3 Wash.2d 180, 100 P.2d. 30, 31 (1940); Bock v. Truck
& Tractor, Inc., 18 Wash.2d 458, 139 P.2d 706, 709 (1943).
89. VOLD, SALES § 140 (1931); 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 194 (Rev. ed. 1948).
90. Roberts v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n, 211 Mass. 449, 98 N.E. 95

(1912); Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940).
91. VOLD, SALES 444 (1931); Bogert and Fink, Business Practice Regarding

Warranties in the Sale of Goods, 25 ILL. L. REV. 400 (1930).
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second theory is that in view of the circumstances of modern business
practice and the control over distribution retained by the producer, an
actual relationship of privity of contract does exist between the manufacturer and the consumer.92 This theory was effectively expressed in
Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co.93 : "[T]he representations ... constitute an implied contract, or implied warranty, to the
unknown and helpless consumer.... If privity of contract is required,
then, under the situation and circumstances of modern merchandising
in such matters, privity of contract exists in the consciousness and
understanding of all right-thinking persons."
6. Adoption of Manufacturer's Warranties
Where the buyer, fearing to sue the manufacturer because of lack
of privity with him, chooses to sue the retailer, he may be confronted
with the reverse side of the privity problem, since the representations
94
Recognizing
he sues on may have been made by the manufacturer.
in the face
did
they
as
reacted
have
courts
the
dilemma,
the buyer's
of
interests
in
the
that,
held
have
and
requirement,
privity
of the
manufacof
the
representations
the
justice, the dealer has adopted
turer.9 5 Whether the local dealer will be held to have so adopted the
manufacturer's representations depends upon the facts of the particular case. Proffer of a manufacturer's pamphlet by a salesman of
the dealer indicates adoption.96 Likewise, the advertising has been
held to furnish evidence of a salesman's authority to make a similar
warranty on behalf of his employer.97 Where the relationship of a
92. Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, 88 A.L.R. 521, a.fd

mem. on rehearing,15 P.2d 1118 (1932), 18 CORNELL L.Q. 445 (1933), 46 HARV.
L. REv. 161, (1932) 7 WAsu. L. REv. 351 (1932); see Madouros v. Kansas City
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445, 450 (1936); Chanin
v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F.2d 889, 891, 111 A.L.R. 1235 (7th Cir. 1937) (buyerplaintiff argued that "the manufacturer is heavily interested in the distribution

of its product by the retail dealer and, having carried on extensive advertising
... for the promotion of sales of its product by its dealers, and ... has brought
about a relationship between himself and the consuming public out of which

grows a direct contractual liability.... ." But the same was not pleaded, so not
considered on appeal.); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 2-318 (Official Draft
1952).
93. 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d at 450.
94. See note 83, supra.
95. Ventura Mfg. & Implement Co. v. Warfield, 37 Cal. App. 147, 174 Pac.
382 (1918); Silverstein v. R. H. Macy & Co., 266 App. Div. 5, 40 N.Y.S.2d 916
(1st Dep't 1943), affd mem., 269 App. Div. 651, 53 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1st Dep't
(1945); Sicard v. Kremer, 133 Ohio St. 291, 13 N.E.2d 250 (1938) semble; cf.
Jones v. Hackensack Auto Wreckers, Inc., 124 N.J.L. 289, 11 A.2d 595 (Sup.

Ct. 1940); see Cool v. Fighter, 239 Mich. 42, 214 N.W. 162, 163 (1927). Contra:

Pemberton v. Dean, 88 Minn. 60, 92 N.W. 478 (1902); Cochran v. McDonald,
23 Wash.2d 348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945). See generally, Waite, Retail Responsibility
and Judicial Law Making, 34 MIcH. L. REV. 494 (1936).
96. Silverstein v. R.H. Macy & Co., 266 App. Div. 5, 40 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1st Dep't

1943), affd mem., 269 App. Div. 651, 53 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1st Dep't 1945).
97. Levis v. Pope Motor Car Co., 202 N.Y. 402, 95 N.E. 815 (1911); Keystone
Mausoleum Co. v. Salzman, 72 Pa. Super. 437 (1919); cf. Herring, Farrell &
Sherman v. Skaggs, 62 Ala. 180, 34 Am. Rep. 4 (1878); McGaughey v. Richard-
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manufacturer and dealer resembles that of principal and agent - as
where goods are consigned - there is an indication of adoption by the
dealer. Furthermore, advertising arrangements are frequently made
whereby the dealer and manufacturer share responsibility for advertising. For example, some manufacturers give their dealers "advertising
credits" based on the latter's prior sales records, which are used as a
basis for sharing expenses of advertising done under the direction of
the local dealer. This joint venture should indicate joint liability to a
buyer who has been thereby induced to purchase. The enumeration of
fact patterns herein does not purport to exhaust the plaintiff's possibilities. Any determination of adoption of a manufacturer's warranties by a dealer must depend upon close analysis and persuasive
presentation of the facts.
B. Implied Warranties
Superficially, it would seem that the seller's advertising is intrinsically inapplicable to actions for the breach of an implied warranty.
Section 15 (1) of the Uniform Sales Act 98 provides:
"Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the
seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he
be a grower, or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that
the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose."

A number of cases have held that when it is suggested in advertising
that a product is fit for a particular purpose, there is an implied warranty of fitness for that purpose, regardless of whether or not the
representation constituted an express warranty. 99 Thus in Moeckel v.
Diesenroth,100 it was held that an advertisement regarding a particular
group of cows for sale, "All giving milk or heavy springers," was not
an express warranty, but that the grouping together in the advertisement of these cows, apart from the rest of the herd being sold, caused
the buyer of cows from this group to buy for a particular purpose, and
gave rise to an implied warranty of fitness for that purpose.
Section 15 (4) of the Act provides that where the goods are sold
under a patented or trade name there shall be no implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose. This provision can be a serious obson, 148 Mass. 608, 20 N.E. 202 (1889); Boothby v. Scales, 27 Wis. 626 (1871).
See also, Ferson, Agency to Make Warranties, 5 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1951).
98. UNIoFRM COMMERcIAL CODE § 2-315 (Official Draft 1952), provides similarly.
99. Raymond v. J. R. Watkins Co., 88 F. Supp. 932 (D. Minn. 1950); Laclede
Steel Co. v. Silas Mason Co., 67 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. La. 1946): Huscher v.
Pfost, 122 Colo. 301, 221 P.2d 931 (1950); Moeckel v. Diesenroth. 253 Mich. 284,
235 N.W. 157, 74 A.L.R. 116 (1931); Pietrus v. Watkins Co., 229 Minn. 179, 38
N.W.2d 799 (1949).
100. 253 Mich. 284, 235 N.W. 157, 74 A.L.R. 116 (1931).
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stacle to a plaintiff's recovery. Indeed, an advertiser can accomplish
a two-fold objective by urging that his unseen audience request his
product by its brand name, e.g., "Don't say corn flakes, say Crunchies."
First, demand for the product is stimulated; second, the seller is insured against liability on an implied warranty of fitness. This provision
of the Sales Act has been criticized' 01 and has been omitted from the
new Uniform Commercial Code. Certainly it is inappropriate in today's world of national advertising and supermarkets.
C. Negligence
As indicated above, the element of negligence may be involved in
action for deceit or breach of warranty. A number of cases have held
that a representation in advertising may give rise to an action sounding
in negligence alone. Thus where an advertising pamphlet negligently
describes the manner in which a potentially dangerous product is to
be used and where a buyer is injured after following those directions,
he has a cause of action for negligence. 10 3 Furthermore, the advertiser
may be liable for negligently recommending a particular use for a
product. 0 4 The case of Ahrens v. Moore'0 5 stated three elements for
this cause of action: (1) that the product sold is not presently in
general use; (2) that the seller had notice of its dangerous qualities;
and (3) that he made positive representations that it was fit for a particular use which cause plaintiff's injury. The defense of contributory
negligence might successfully be asserted in an action for negligent
advertising, as, for example, where the buyer fails to follow directions
given by the seller or otherwise known to the buyer. 106
02

III. CONCLUSIONS
The law prescribing a buyer's remedies against a seller who has
induced a sale by misleading advertising has not kept pace with the
institutional development of advertising. Insofar as it has taken any
101. Isaacs, The Consumer at Law, 173 ANNALS 177 (1934). Hobart Mfg.
Co. v. Rodziewicz, 125 Pa. 240, 189 Atl. 580 (1937), held that where the buyer
relied on representations in advertisements and the sale of the article by its
trade name was at the inducement of the seller's agent, then the implied warranty of fitness was not lost.
102. Supra p ........
103. Marsh v. Usk Hardware Co., 73 Wash. 543, 132 Pac. 241 (1913) (strict
liability); see E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Baridon, 73 F.2d 26, 30 (8th
Cir. 1934).
104. Hruska v. Parke, Davis & Co., 6 F.2d 536 (8th Cir. 1925); Ahrens v.
Moore, 206 Ark. 1035, 178 S.W.2d 256 (1944); Anderson v. Tyler, 223 Iowa 1033,
274 N.W. 48 (1937) semble; Nelson v. Healey, 151 Kan. 512, 99 P.2d 795 (1940);
Sicard v. Kremer, 133 Ohio St. 291, 13 N.E.2d 250 (1938) sembZe.
105. 206 Ark. 1035, 178 S.W.2d 256 (1944).
106. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Baridon, 73 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1934);
McGee v. Bennett, 72 Ga. App. 271, 33 S.E.2d 577 (1945); see Bahlman v.
Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309, 314-15 (1939) (Dissenting
Opinion). Collection of cases in Note, 55 A.L.R. 1047 (1928).
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notice of the widespread use and misuse of advertising in inducing
sales, the law has chosen to prescribe criminal penalties rather than
restitution of damages to the injured buyer. The law has been so unrealistic that businessmen themselves have accepted a duty toward
107
those with whom they deal, beyond that which the law imposes in the same manner as the early English merchants who developed the
law merchant to remedy the shortcomings of the common law in commercial matters. Evidence of this today is found in "store slogans,"
"manufactures' policies" and commercial codes of ethics, all based on
the sound doctrine that a satisfied customer is a returning customer and
the world's best advertisement. 108
A number of fact patterns emerge from the cases, however, where
buyers have been given relief in the courts for breach of warranties
and misrepresentations contained in advertising. Thus, if a plaintiff's
case fits one of these patterns and if he is able to prove that the representation upon which he based his suit was integrated in his contract
of sale, that it did not constitute dealer's talk, and that he was in
privity of contract with the defendant, he has a considerable chance
of recovery. It is even possible that a plaintiff may plead and prove
an implied warranty or negligence on the part of the seller, based on
the seller's advertising. The numerous cases where a buyer has been
denied well-merited relief indicate, however, that a revision of the law
of sales is in order, to take into account one of the most important
institutions in the merchandising field.
RONALD A. MAY
JOHN C. NOWELL, JR.
107. VOLD, SALEs 444 (1931); Bogert and Fink, Business Practice Regarding
Warranties in the Sale of Goods, 25 ILL. L. REv. 400, 416 (1930).
108. VOLD, SALEs 444 (1931).

